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MEDIEVAL THEORY AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY
CORNELIUS F. MURPHY, JR.*
For some time scholars have speculated as to the relevance of
medieval life to the problems of the present century. Tawney, in his
classic Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, wrote of the attempt being
made:
. . . to restate the practical implications of social ethics of
the Christian faith, in a form sufficiently comprehensive to
provide a standard by which to judge the collective actions
. .. of mankind .. . 1
More recently, Christopher Dawson has written of the need for higher
spiritual principles of coordination to overcome "the conflict. between self
interest and the common good."' A comparable movement on a sec-
ular plane is the quest of contemporary legal scholars, such as Jerome
Hall, for an integrative jurisprudence, one which seeks a comprehen-
sive, interrelated fusion between Jurisprudence, Legal Theory and
Positive Law.' The need for such fusion—for an integral approach to
law—is perhaps triggered by the presence of many legal problems, the
solution of which is not to be found in the traditional procedures of
judicial method, nor by the application of traditional legal concepts.
Reasoning by analogy breaks down when the underlying assumptions
no longer exist.4 Time-honored notions of "fault" based upon a failure
to observe the "reasonable man" standard lose their value in the face
of scientific discovery that no fault, in the negligent sense, was involved
in the action in question. 5 One difficult issue in this area is that of
products liability—the liability of a producer or manufacturer to the
ultimate user of his product, for injuries resulting from a latent defect,
in the absence of privity of contract between the parties and any prov-
able negligence in the manufacturing processes. This is an area in
which considerable disagreement exists as to the desirability of impos-
ing legal liability upon the remote vendor. After analyzing the prob-
lem, an attempt will be made to show the relevance of some medieval
* Instructor, University of Virginia Law School. B.S. 1954, Holy Cross College;
LL.B. 1957, Boston College Law School.
1 Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism 4 (1948).
2 Dawson, Schism in Education, The Commonweal Vol. LXXIV, No. 2 (April 7,
1961), excerpt from a forthcoming book, Crisis of Western Education (Sheed & Ward
1961).
J. Hall, Studies in Jurisprudence and Criminal Theory (1958); J. Hall, The
Present Position of Jurisprudence in the United States, 44 Va. L. Rev. 321 (1958).
4 Pound, Law Finding Through Reason and Experience (1960).
See Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (1954) ; and Pound,
The Problem of the Exploding Bottle, 40 B.U.L. Rev. 167 (1960).
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ideas to it, and the way in which such ideas can assist in solution of
the difficulty.
It is well, before proceeding, to define what is meant by medieval
theory. Medieval society was conceived by its members to be an
organic whole. Within it were two principal spheres of influence: the
Church and the State. Because of the overriding concept of unity, the
Spiritual and Temporal orders were seen as two sides or aspects of the
single Christian Commonwealth. Mutual cooperation between the two
was encouraged, with a view towards achieving a full and harmonious
life for medieval man' One aspect of that cooperation, which shall
be examined here, was the attempt by the civil society to realize in its
positive law the spiritual and moral teachings of the Church. The
means employed was also significant, for it was to a large degree the
collective activity of the group exercising regulatory power which was
the most important means of insuring good order. It is, then, these
two aspects of medieval life, the attempted realization of spiritual and
moral teaching in the temporal sphere, and the collective activity of
the people or their , leaders seeking the realization of these ideals, with
which we shall be concerned.
Before examining medieval society further, one should first, in a
general way, explore the attitude taken by the American judiciary to-
wards the liability of a seller for injuries caused by his defective prod-
ucts. Seixas v. Woods,' decided in 1804, established the rule of caveat
emptor with respect to latent defects. In announcing the majority de-
cision, Chancellor Kent was reflecting the prevailing economic view of
the day, that social well-being was best achieved by not shackling the
enterprising spirit with an excess of legal regulation. With the excep-
tion of food cases, 8
 it was not until the adoption of the Uniform Sales
Act that warranty responsibility was extended to general sales of
merchandise. Yet these warranties were developed upon principles of
contract law, and were not designed to cover the situation of a middle-
man market without privity between the vendor and the ultimate con-
sumer or user of the product. Some courts have attempted to extend
the scope of the warranties to cover the economic realities. In so
doing, they have strained the limits of judicial ingenuity while achiev-
ing only limited success. A parallel development has been the attempt
by the judiciary to hold the remote vendor° liable in negligence. Al-
Cierke, Political Theories of the Middle Ages 1-17 (1927).
r 2 Cai. R. 48, 2 Am. Dec. 215 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
8 Strict liability of a warranty nature for defective food was established early in
New York. Van Bracklin v. Fonda, 12 Johns. R. 468 (N.Y. 1815).
9
 The term "remote vendor", is used to designate those who by reasonable classifi-
cation, can be held responsible for latent defects because of their control over the
product.
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though originally limited to matters which were considered "inherently
dangerousP° the liability now extends, generally, to the sellers of any
chattel.il
A new dimension has been added to this problem in recent years.
A tendency has developed which seeks to hold the seller liable to an
ultimate consumer for injuries resulting from the use of the product,
although the seller had exercised all possible care in making the prod-
uct, and the user had not entered into any contractual relationship
with him.12
 The emergence of such demands is not traceable to any
single cause. It is, no doubt, due in some measure to the extreme em-
phasis upon security which characterizes our age. A good deal of it is
traceable to a dissatisfaction with the capacity of the judicial process
to meet the demands arising from our complex market structure. Some
of the proponents of absolute liability argue that the seller should be
liable because he is in a better financial position to bear the loss, and
can pass the expense on to the general public through the medium of
higher prices. 13 Yet it has been pointed out that many sellers, because
of the intensity of the competition in their particular markets, are not
in a position to make the necessary price adjustments. 14 If the matter
is approached from the viewpoint of reasonable expectation--i.e., is it
reasonable for those injured by defective products to assume that the
seller should make good their loss? 15—we are then at the threshold of
responsibility, even though no fault is involved, at least in the tradi-
tional negligence sense. Those who would impose liability argue that,
in certain commercial activities, some damage can be forseen as a con-
sequence of conducting the particular business, and since it is forsee-
able, those conducting that business should be responsible for it. Thus,
anticipation of harm at the start of the business, rather than at the
time of the specific act of production which led to injury, would be the
basis of liability. As developed by Ehrenzweig, liability is then the
10 Thomas v, Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852); Huset v. J. I. Case
Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
11 The development of legal theory in this area has been extensively traced by
various authors. See, e.g., Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel, 69 Yale L. J. 1099 (1960);
Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault (1951).
12 See Prosser and Ehrenzweig, supra note 11, and Pound, op. cit. supra note 5, esp.
at 72 et. seq. Such cases include: Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply
Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958) and Continental Copper and Steel Industries
v. E. C. "Red" Cornelius, 104 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1958). •
13 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (con-
curring opinion).
14 Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in
Products—An Opposing View, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 938 (1957); Peairs, The God in the
Machine, 29 B.U.L. Rev. 37 (1949).
15 See Pound, op. cit. supra note 5, at 105-06.
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price which must be paid to society for permission to conduct an "ultra-
hazardous" activity, on an analogy to cases in which contractors agree
with municipalities to assume responsibility for all damage caused by
some ultrahazardous activity such as blasting. Thus:
.. the contemplated test may be related to a hypothetical
agreement between the entrepreneur and the state, under
which the enterprise is permitted or licensed in spite of its
known dangerous nature, in consideration of the assumption
of full liability for those, and only those, damages which may
reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of
both parties at the time they made the "contract," that is,
when the "license" was granted. Causation of such (typical)
harm could be considered as bringing the "contractual"
liability into operation, whether or not the harmful event was
was preceded by "fault.""
Those who oppose the tendency point out, as stated above, the
fallacy of the "ability to pass" argument, the great difficulty in tracing
causation, the non-ultrahazardous nature, in the traditional Rylands v.
Fletcher" sense, of most business activity and the absence of inten-
tional wrongdoing or carelessness on the part of the seller." It is also
argued, with much force, that absolute liability would run against
accepted ideas of justice:
. . . For more than 150 years the accepted legal basis of tort
liability in Anglo-American law has been the general philoso-
phy that, except for intentional wrongdoing, a person should
be accorded freedom of action, subject only to the limitation
that in exercising this freedom he must use the care which can
be expected of a reasonably prudent man. He must meet this
social standard; if he does not he will be held liable for the
injuries he causes. Whereas primitive law stressed security,
modern law stresses freedom of action . . . this philosophy
has contributed to the enormous economic and social progress
of this country. . . . It has enhanced the atmosphere of
encouragement to the man who generates new ideas and has
a venturesome temperament."
It is clear that a resolution of the difficulty will turn, in some degree,
upon ethical notions indicating proper allocation of responsibility in
10 Ehrenzweig, supra note 11, at 54.
lz L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
18 See Peairs, supra note 14.
tsi Plant, supra note 14, at 940.
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order to justify the imposition of liability. Insurance schemes may
help to distribute expense, but do not decide ultimate questions. It is
also clear that we do not have readily at hand any legal principle which
can be applied to the problem with much probability of reaching a
successful solution. It is at this point then that we can, with some
justification, return to medieval theory in quest of some helpful
principles.
In medieval society the regulation of trade and commerce was
characterized by a strong preference for the rights of the consumer.
Extensive regulation sought to insure that all products were the result
of good workmanship and proper measure, and that they were sold
for a fair price. The community at large was also given preference."
This reflected a political outlook very different from that of the
eighteenth and nineteenth century both in England and in this country.
In medieval times the burden of proof was upon those who would deny
the state's right of regulation; the later view was to shift the burden to
those who would interfere." What was important was the sense of
community; the seller who violated the regulation injured the commu-
nity even more than he injured the consumer:
The records attest the dominance of the idea of solidarity.
The welfare of the collect is always given first position. . . .
In the prevailing legal theory it was not so much the buyer
who was injured as the commune."
This dual concern for the consumer and the general public placed
responsibility upon the seller not only for fraudulent concealment of
defects, but also for latent defects of which he had no knowledge. On
the continent, this resulted in civil liability." In England, the existence
of civil responsibility is disputed; 24 however, some responsibility of a
criminal or quasi-criminal character fell upon the innocent seller. In
all of this the society was attempting to realize the ethical teachings of
the Church as a means of insuring a well ordered community. St.
Thomas Aquinas had provided the moral framework. He had taught
that the seller's responsibility for a latent defect included those of
which he had no knowledge." When the defect was brought to his
20 2 Holdsworth, A History of English Law (1923); Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim
Caveat Emptor, 40 Yale L. J. 1133 (1931).
21 2 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 20, at 468.
22 Hamilton, supra note 20, at 1152.
23 See Morrow, Warranty of Quality: A Comparative Survey, 14 Tul. L. Rev. 327,
529 (1940).
24 Compare Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 Yale L. J. 1133
(1931) with Perkins, Unwholesome Food as a Source of Liability, 5 Iowa L. Bul. 6
(1919).
25 Summa Theologica. II II, Q. 77, A.2. .
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attention the seller was bound to make restitution, for it was always
unlawful:
. . to give anyone an occasion of danger or loss . . . the
seller who offers goods for sale gives the buyer an occasion
for loss or danger by the very fact that he offers him defective
goods if such defect may occasion loss or danger to the
buyer.2°
Much of this regulation of trade, requiring the seller to account for
latent defects, continued in Continental Europe following the decline of
the Middle Ages.27 Such was not the case in England, however, where
societal control of economic activity broke down in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. The' disintegration was due to many causes,
political, economic and religious; yet all had the common thread of
individual activity asserting itself against all forms of regulation. It
meant caveat emptor, consecrated by the court of Exchequer as early
as 1603 in Chandelor v. Lopus28
 with its famous bezar-stone. The
remote user found himself without recovery because of the "outrageous
consequences that would follow" in Winterbottorn v. Wright,29 and it
was not illogical that pioneering America, which had inherited the
philosophy of economic liberalism, should echo these sentiments.
When one assesses the value of traditional moral principles in
resolving contemporary problems, it is important that the relevance
be not oversimplified. A coincidence of ethical teaching and civil law
was possible in medieval society for reasons which are no longer
existent. Medieval society was characterized by a religious unity which
made the identity of law and morality a relatively easy matter. The
• Spiritual and the Temporal orders were seen as two sides of a single
Christian Commonwealth. Matters of trade were, by and large, im-
mediate and intra-personal, and, therefore, the application of personal
morality to personal activity was fairly easy." This primitive market
structure has changed considerably with the rise of the complexity of
the middleman. Where the immediacy remains, such as in the simple
seller-buyer situation, one has no difficulty (where the production is
under full control of the seller) in imposing warranty liability. The
problem of the remote vendor, with the presence of so many additional
factors, such as dubious causation, gives one pause."
28 Id. at II II, Q. 77, A.2. Liability had been imposed upon the seller for damages
occasioned by unknown defects under the Roman Edictal system. Buckland, A Text-
book of Roman Law 488, 489 (1921).
27
 For analysis of this development, see Morrow, supra note 23.
28 Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (1603).
29 10 M. & W. 109, 114; 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Exch. 1842).
80 See Cunningham, Industry and Commerce 466.
81 The provisions of the French Code have been used to impose liability on the
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Yet if the determination of the problem is to be made in the
context of whether or not the expectation of recovering by consumers is
a reasonable one, the ethical teaching of responsibility for latent
defects regardless of the seller's knowledge is relevant, for it provides
a rational framework within which the difficulties can be resolved.
Once its value is accepted, it is possible to make some defensible
allocations of responsibility. It would be reasonable, for example, to
limit liability to those injuries which may reasonably be foreseen as
typically occurring as a consequence of conducting the enterprisej 32 to
impose, in the case of branded canned goods, responsibility upon the
manufacturer who takes credit for his product, rather than upon an
innocent retailer ;" to impose liability upon a distributor who markets
the goods of many small producers.34 Where the middleman is no more
than a conduit, the application of the medieval rule is evident, for the
remote vendor is then truly the "seller" in the ethical sense. It is clear
that some hardship will necessarily result in making classifications, but
such is inevitable in a field as complex as this. In view of the availa-
bility of insurance, it does not seem that any hardship will be unduly
burdensome.
The medieval ethic is not without value for correcting excessive
humanitarianism. Medieval society was not the prototype of a welfare
state; the consumer could not act irrationally and expect its protection.
If the defects were manifest, the buyer was on notice; he was not to be
afforded any greater protection than he needed." Again, the reason-
ableness of the expectations can be examined with reference to this
ethical ideal to form the basis of a reasonable solution.
There is another aspect of medievalism that is pertinent. The
history of products liability records the valiant but unsuccessful
attempts by many courts to extend warranties to remote vendors, either
by stretching the warranty by use of various fictions" or by the
imposition of traditional ideas of "negligence!'" It is becoming
increasingly evident that the judicial process has all but exhausted the
possibilities of making common law notions achieve the necessary
equilibrium. Here also medieval theory can be helpful. In the middle
remote vendor for latent defects of which he had no knowledge. See Morrow, supra note
23, at 550.
82 This is Ehrenzweig's theory. Op. cit. supra note 11.
33 Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra note 11, at 80.
34 Id. at 81.
33 See Morrow, supra note 23. This is Aquinas's view. Summa Theologica II II,
Q. 77 .A.3. For a discussion of patent and latent defects, see Report of the New York
Law Revision Commission, Leg. Doc. 65, p. 460 (1943).
Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 Ore. L. Rev. 119, 153 (1957).
37 See Prosser, supra note 11, at 1100-01.
35
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
ages the power of the community was brought to bear upon the
problems of trade through the use of legislative processes. The local
boroughs, through their boards of Aldermen, regulated commercial
matters within their jurisdiction when the welfare of the community
so demanded. These functions were later assumed by the Parliament.
The legislative power was the most effective way of achieving commu-
nity rule." We have seen a similar movement in this century in the
increasing awareness of the power inherent in the legislative process
for achieving social justice. 89
 But most of this has been on a national
or federal level. What exists on a local or state level is principally
legislation imposing criminal penalties for violation of community
standards, or the use of the administrative process for realizing
desirable social goals. What is yet to be fully explored is the immense
potential of the state legislature for achieving social justice by creating
direct civil remedies." The instant problem is one in which effective
reform can only come through the legislative process. It is certainly
not found in the existing Uniform Commercial Code. 41 To work for
imposition of liability upon the remote vendor does no disservice to the
tremendous economic and social advantages which have accrued to us
as a result of the free enterprise system. If those who have an under-
lying responsibility have the means of fulfilling it, either directly, or
through the use of the insurance mechanism, there is no good reason
for not imposing the rule. To those who would immunize the remote
vendor because the common law had given him a preferential position,
the short answer is that the periodic demands for social justice, which
have asserted themselves with continual vigor in this century, are
38
 See 2 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 20, and Hamilton, supra note 20.
39
 The development is traced in Morganthau, The Purpose of American Politics
79 et seq. (1960). See also Commager, The American Mind (1950).
40 Georgia has passed a statute which provides:
The manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property, either directly
or through wholesale or retail dealers or any other person, shall warrant the
following to the ultimate consumer, who, however, must exercise caution when
purchasing to detect defects, and provided there is no express covenant of
warranty and no agreement to the contrary:
1. The article sold is merchantable and reasonably suited to the uses
intended.
2. The manufacturer knows of no latent defects undisclosed. Ga. Code
§ 96-307 (1933).
The statute has been held constitutional. Bookhalt v. General Motors Corp., 215 Ga.
391, 110 S.E.2d 642 (1959). See also L. Patterson, Manufacturer's Statutory Warranty:
Tort or Contract?, 10 Mercer L. Rev. 272 (1959). As for the potential use of Codes
in this country, see The Code Napolean and the Common Law World (1960).
41 The Code warranty provisions run beyond the immediate vendor only in cases
involving food or other articles for human consumption, where other members of a
household and guests are also protected. UCC § 2-318. See Kaczmarkiewicz v. J. A.
Williams Co., 13 Pa. D. & C. 2d 14 (C. P., Allegheny Cty. 1957).
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voicing their preference for values which are truly human. Granting
that the ethical ideal and the legal rule are not always identical, neither
should the wisdom of medieval Christendom be denied to those who
desire its use in eradicating injustice. To those who insist upon the
supremacy of economic considerations over human welfare, the words
of Tawney are still worth thoughtful consideration:
The most obvious facts are the most easily forgotten. Both
the existing economic order, and too many of the projects
advanced for reconstructing it break down through their
neglect of the truism that, since even quite common men
have souls, no increase in material wealth will compensate
them for arrangements which insult their self-respect and
impair their freedom. A reasonable estimate of economic
organization must allow for the fact that, unless industry
is to be paralyzed by recurrent revolts on the part of out-
raged human nature, it must satisfy criteria which are not
purely economic . . . the medieval insistence that riches exist
for man, not man for riches . emphasizes the instrumental
character of economic activities, by reference to an ideal
which is held to express the true nature of man.'
42 Tawney, op. cit. supra note 1, at 284-85.
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